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In the wake of several much-celebrated cases in which aliens had
deferred deportation for years through skillful use of the appeals
process,' Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) 2 in 1961 to reduce the possibilities for courtroom maneuvers
designed to defeat the enforcement of deportation orders.' The addi-
tion of section 106 to the INA streamlined judicial review in depor-
tation cases. As part of new limitations on such review, in a clause
subjected to little congressional scrutiny, the amendment ostensibly
shut the door on all appeals of deportation once an alien has de-
parted the United States.
More than twenty-five years later, many of the ills Congress ad-
dressed with the 1961 amendment have reemerged with a force that
warrants legislative reconsideration of the issue. Through the calcu-
lated use of appeals to final deportation orders - which allow for an
automatic stay of deportation in their pendency - deportable aliens
may delay for months and years their expulsion from the United
States. The statutory incentives to create such delay are obvious: the
* B.A. 1982, Harvard College; J.D. 1987, University of Virginia. Special assistant
to the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State. The author wishes to thank Professor
David A. Martin of the University of Virginia, without whose guidance this article would
not have been written. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily represent
those of the United States Government.
I. See infra notes 11-38 and accompanying text.
2. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1982) [hereinafter
INA].
3. INA § 106, 8 U.S.C. § l105a.
alien not only continues to enjoy his presence here but also keeps
open the possibility for reversal of his deportable status through the
review process. The consequences of departure under the pall of a
deportation order are ultimate, if section 106(c) is enforced as in-
tended; the order moves beyond the sphere of judicial challenge as
the courts lose jurisdiction over its review.
Some jurisdictions, led by the Ninth Circuit and its 1977 decision
in Mendez v. INS," have moved to soften the sharp edges of the
departure rule. Under the so-called Mendez exception, a court may
entertain petitions for review of deportation orders and motions to
reopen from a deportee already departed if the deportation is not
"legally executed," or order the alien's readmittance so that such
proceedings may go forward.5 The exception enjoys no foundation in
the legislative history of section 106(c). Indeed, as the Fifth Circuit
concluded in Umanzor v. Lambert,6 the Mendez decision has become
a potential "sinkhole" into which the departure rule could be swal-
lowed altogether.7 The Mendez exception initially applied to only the
more egregious cases of official misconduct in the execution of depor-
tation orders, instances of kidnapping - not always proverbial - by
the immigration authorities, implicating a basic infringement of the
alien's due process. As noted in Umanzor, it since has paved the way
for courts to consider, under the guise of jurisdictional questions, the
merits of all challenges filed from abroad. 8 The alien with frivolous
claims is thus permitted to burden the immigration administrators
and the courts from both inside and outside the United States, ex-
actly the problem that Congress sought to address with the passage
of section 106(c).
This is not to say, however, that the Mendez line of decisions is
entirely bereft of sound consideration. Just as the departure rule pro-
vokes dilatory maneuvers by likely deportees, it also encourages the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to hasten the depor-
tation of aliens enjoying meritorious claims in the appeal of their
deportation orders. There are cases in which the immigration author-
ities appear to have sought to effect deportation so as to moot the
administrative hearing of an alien's motion to reconsider, to which
an automatic stay does not attach.9 In those circuits where Mendez
has not prevailed, an alien with valid grounds for reconsideration
may never get his last day in court, departure having precluded fur-
ther review of his file.
4. 563 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1977).
5. Id. at 958-59.
6. 782 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1986).
7. Id. at 1303.
8. Id.
9. See infra notes 82-83; see also 8 C.F.R. § 242.22 (1987) (automatic stay).
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Part I of this Article examines the legislative history of section
106, highlighting congressional consideration of the departure rule.
The Article concludes that the rule was intended to prevent all ap-
peals of deportation orders by aliens who have left the United States,
regardless of the circumstances of their departure. Part II discusses
the Mendez line of cases and the Fifth Circuit's recent criticism of
the exception in Umanzor v. Lambert. This part also comments upon
the potential for INS abuse of the departure rule. Finding that
neither the rule nor its exception best serves the dual objectives of
deterring manipulative delay while affording fairness to aliens seek-
ing to challenge the finality of their deportation, Part III of this Ar-
ticle recommends that, with certain exceptions, deportation appeals
be permitted only from abroad. 10 The change, to be implemented by
amending section 106, would eliminate present incentives to file friv-
olous appeals but would, at the same time, protect the rights of those
aliens able to demonstrate their right to administrative or judicial
relief.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DEPARTURE RULE
The late 1950s witnessed a series of cases in which reputed racke-
teers and "subversives" had proved able to avoid deportation by ex-
ploiting expanded rights of review recently granted to aliens." In
1955 the United States Supreme Court ruled that the judicial review
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act 2 applied to all de-
portation cases.' 3 This change allowed aliens to pursue declaratory
and injunctive remedies to deportation orders where, in the past,
10. The proposal is Professor Martin's. See Martin, Mandel, Cheng Fan Kwok,
and Other Unappealing Cases: The Next Frontier of Immigration Reform, 27 VA. J.
INT'L L. 803, 815-19 (1987).
11. Six or seven particularly grievous instances of successful delay were repeatedly
trotted out in congressional debate to support the passage of section 106, the most notori-
ous of which was the case of Carlos Marcello. See H.R. REP. No. 565, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. 7-11 (1961) (litigation chronology of Marcello deportation case); id. at 20-26
(chronologies of other cases); Judicial Review of Deportation and Exclusion Orders:
Hearing Before Subcomm. No. I of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1958) [hereinafter Hearings on Judicial Review of Deportation Orders] (testimony of
Rep. Celler) (noting cases highlighted by the Commissioner of the INS).
12. Pub. L. No. 79-404, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 701-706).
13. Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955); see also Letter from Deputy
Attorney General Byron R. White to House Judiciary Committee Chairman Emanuel
Celler (Apr. 18, 1961), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 565, supra note 11, at 3-4. The
Court later held that the APA also governed judicial review of exclusion orders. Brownell
v. Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956).
only the route of habeas corpus had been available to them.14 Cou-
pled with other factors, such as the existing inapplicability of res
judicata to rulings on deportation challenges, these new opportunities
were exploited by many for the obvious purpose of delay. President
Eisenhower brought these cases to the attention of Congress, and
requested legislative action to curb the possibilities for abuse.1"
Harping on these examples," and spearheaded by the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary,17 Congress responded by enacting section
106.18
Adapting the review framework of the Hobbs Act'9 to the immi-
gration context, the new law eliminated the possibility for declara-
tory and injunctive relief in deportation appeals and restricted judi-
cial review of all "final orders" of deportation to the courts of
appeals,20 while protecting the constitutional right to petition for
habeas corpus. 1 It limited the period during which an alien could
14. See T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 564-65
(1985). Review of a petition for habeas corpus was, at that time, generally available only
where the petitioner was in the physical custody of enforcement authorities, i.e., in jail.
This requirement since has been abandoned in cases outside the immigration area. See
Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973) (parole constitutes custody); Jones v.
Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) (petition for habeas corpus allowed from individual
released on own recognizance); United States ex rel. Marcello v. District Director of
Immigration, 634 F.2d 964 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 917 (1981) (alien subject to
INS supervised parole allowed to petition under section 106(a)(9)). It seems likely that a
deportation order, in itself, is insufficient to establish the custody requirement of habeas
review for section 106 purposes. See Umanzor v. Lambert, 782 F.2d 1299, 1302 (5th Cir.
1986); United States ex rel. Marcello, 634 F.2d at 971 & n.1 1.
15. See H.R. Doc. No. 85, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. (1957) (message from President
Eisenhower, Jan. 31, 1957) ("the growing frequency of. . . cases brought for purposes
of delay, particularly those involving aliens found to be criminals and traffickers in nar-
cotics and subversion, makes imperative the need for legislation limiting and carefully
defining the judicial process"). See also H.R. Doc. No. 329, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (mes-
sage from President Eisenhower, Feb. 8, 1956) (advocating same).
16. See supra note 8; see also Hearings on Judicial Review of Deportation Orders,
supra note 11, at 22 (statement of Rep. Walter); 107 CONG. REC. H 18,286 (1961) (re-
marks of Rep. Poff). Critics of the legislative response noted that this handful of cases
did not necessarily merit the comprehensive response of section 106. See Hearings on
Judicial Review of Deportation Orders, supra note 11, at 3-7 (testimony of Rep. Celler);
H.R. REP. No. 565, supra note 11, at 28-33 (minority views on H.R. 187); 107 Cong.
Rec. S19,653 (1961) (remarks of Sen. Hart). The point was not without some force: of
the 15,285 administrative dispositions of deportation and exclusion cases in 1957, only
298, or 1.9%, were appealed to the courts for habeas corpus or declaratory judgment.
H.R. REP. No. 565, supra note 11, at 29 (minority views).
17. The House took full charge of the drafting and consideration of section 106, to
the point that its version of the amendment was accepted without change by the Senate
in conference. See H.R. REP. No. 1172, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (conference report). See
also 107 CONG. REC. S19,654 (1961) (remarks of Sen. Javits noting apathy of Senate on
the bill).
18. Act of Sept. 26, 1981, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5, 75 Stat. 651 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § l105a).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 158.
20. See 8 U.S.C. § l105a.
21. See id. § 1105a(a)(9); see also H.R. REP. No. 565, supra note 11, at 15
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appeal the entry of a deportation order;22 mandated the exhaustion
of administrative remedies before an alien could turn to the courts;2
3
and required petitions for review to include notice of previous judi-
cial action on the claim,24 thus confirming the applicability of res
judicata to immigration cases. 25 Finally, the statute provided that
"[a]n order of deportation or exclusion shall not be reviewed. . . if
[the alien] has departed from the United States after the issuance of
the order."
'26
The departure rule of section 106(c) was not subjected to exten-
sive congressional debate. The legislative reports accompanying the
legislation did no more than to restate its statutory terms. During
hearings before the Judiciary Committee on a forerunner identical to
section 106, however, the Congress did confont the departure provi-
sion in the context of the case of William Heikkila, a Finnish na-
tional whose immigration history was among those repeatedly recited
by supporters of section 106.28 Heikkila, an alleged subversive, had
been ordered deported as early as 1948, and yet had managed to
stay in the United States, save for one short interval, up until the
time of his death in 1960.29 The course of much of his litigation
against deportation was unspectacular if effective in its practical
end; through a series of appeals and a petition for habeas corpus,
Heikkila was successful in deferring execution of the order despite
his failure to have the order actually overturned.
What distinguished Heikkila's case, however - and makes it im-
("aliens are not limited to courts of appeal in seeking habeus corpus").
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(1) (mandating that appeal be filed within six months of
effective data of final deportation order).
23. Id. § 1105a(c).
24. Id.
25. The statute also limited the venue of review petitions to the judicial circuit in
which the alien resided, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(2); limited judicial consideration to the
administrative record of the case, with exception for bona fide claims of nationality, 8
U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) & (5); and provided a limited opportunity for collateral attach-
ment of deportation orders in the event of subsequent criminal prosecution for illegal
reentry. See 8 U.S.C. § l105a(a) & (a)(6). For a general consideration of the 1961
amendment, and of the judicial developments that led to its passage, see Note, Deporta-
tion and Exclusion: A Continuing Dialogue Between Congress and the Courts, 71 YALE
L.J. 760, 760-81 (1962).
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c).
27. See H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 28 (1961); H.R. REP. No. 565,
supra note 11, at 14.
28. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 565, supra note 11, at 11, 20-21; Hearings on Judi-
cial Review of Deportation Orders, supra note 11, at 4 (testimony of Rep. Celler) (Heik-
kila case cited by Commissioner of INS).
29. For a chronology of Heikkila's fight against deportation, see H.R. REP. No.
565, supra note 11, at 20-22.
portant to interpretation of the departure rule - were the circum-
stances surrounding his brief expulsion from the country. In April
1958, two weeks after a renewed deportation order had been issued
against him, Heikkila was seized by immigration authorities outside
his office in San Francisco and flown to Vancouver, Canada, where
he was placed aboard a plane to Finland. 30 He was not permitted to
phone either his wife or his attorney before the enforced departure,31
nor was he allowed to contact the Finnish consul. 32 A federal district
court judge had issued a restraining order prohibiting deportation
the day after the expulsion, and as details of the incident came to
public light, public uproar led INS Commissioner Swing to allow
Heikkila's reentry on parole pending appeal. 33 Although some mem-
bers of Congress saw fit to criticize the Heikkila deportation in its
entirety,34 others, including one who would later become a chief
sponsor of section 106, were careful to condemn only an INS failure
to pursue complete disclosure, as opposed to decrying the agency's
methods of enforcement.
35
The Heikkila case could not have been far from all minds when
the Judiciary Committee convened in July 1958 to consider the pro-
posed limitations on review of deportation orders; and in fact, it
emerged during an exchange between members of the committee
and Assistant Attorney General Malcolm Anderson.36 Confronting
30. Heikkila v. Barber, 164 F. Supp. 587, 590 (N.D. Cal. 1958) (denying motion
to find INS District Director in contempt), a.fd, 308 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1962).
31. Finn's Own Kidnap Story, San Francisco News, Apr. 23, 1958, reprinted in
104 CONG. REc. 7095-7096 (1958) (remarks of Rep. Shelley) (Heikkila's own account as
told to reporter); Deportee Return Approved, San Francisco Call-Bulletin, Apr. 22, 1958,
reprinted in 104 CONG. REc. 7094-7095 (1958) (remarks of Rep. Shelley); The Bum's
Rush by Immigration, San Francisco Chron., Apr. 22, 1958, reprinted in 104 CONG.
REc. 7097 (1958) (Acting INS regional commissioner concedes that deportation was
effected without notification of spouse or attorney); see also H.R. REP. No. 565, supra
note 13, at 20-22 (chronology of the Heikkila case).
32. See Finn's Own Kidnap Story, supra note 31, 104 CONG. REc. at 7096.
33. See id.
34. See 104 CONG. REC. 7090 (1958) (remarks of Rep. Shelley); San Francisco
News, Apr. 22, 1958, reprinted in 104 CONG. REC. 7094 (1958) (remarks of Rep. Shel-
ley) (noting critical comments of Rep. Moss).
35. See 104 CONG. REc. 8920 (1958) (extension of remarks of Rep. Hillings); 104
CONG. REc. A3855 (1958) (extension of remarks of Rep. Walter). This view was appar-
ently supported by some editorialists. See Hearings on Judicial Review of Deportation
Orders, supra note 11, at 27 (remarks of Rep. Hillings) (reprinting San Francisco
Chronicle commentary concluding that had the INS "within hours of Heikkila's deporta-
tion, supplied the public with the full facts [of his case] and with legal basis for acting
the storm would never have blown up."). Representative Walter later spoke in strong
support of section 106 both in hearings on the bill and in the floor debate, see Hearings
on Judicial Review of Deportation Orders, supra note 11, at 22 (statement of Rep. Wal-
ter), 107 CONG. REc. 18,281 (1961) (remarks of Rep. Walter, and it was he who submit-
ted the final House and conference reports on the law. See H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1961); H.R. REP. No. 1172, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) (conference
report).
36. Hearings on Judicial Review of Deportation Orders, supra note 11, at 27-31.
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him with the extremity of the Heikkila file - both in the alien's
success with dilatory legal tactics and in the facts of his attempted
deportation - Congressman Hillings pressed Anderson on the
meaning of the departure rule:
Mr. Hillings. This legislation would provide specifically that the deportation
order would not be reviewed if the alien had actually departed from the
United States - to make it clear, it would not be reviewed if he were
outside the United States; is that correct?
Mr. Anderson. That is what is in the bill.
Mr. Hyde. With this in effect, if Heikkila had been deported, there would
be no legal means by which he could have returned.
Mr. Anderson. It provides, if he gets a writ of habeas corpus, that he can
stay until the case is disposed of.




The departure rule was to be given literal effect; a deportation order,
once executed, would become unreviewable. Although Anderson
went on to highlight instances in which aliens had departed volunta-
rily under sufferance of an order,38 his hypothetical application of
the law to the facts of the Heikkila case provides the best indication
of the rule's intended breadth.
JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF SECTION 106(c)
The application of section 106 to immigration appeals launched
from abroad by aliens previously deported received scant judicial at-
tention during the first fifteen years following its enactment. The
courts previously had found the Administrative Procedure Act to al-
low such appeals on the theory that its provision for judicial review
of agency action applied except where expressly precluded by stat-
ute. 9 Section 106 supplied exactly that preclusion, as was recog-
nized in at least two of the three decisions that addressed the ques-
tion40 prior to the Ninth Circuit's sweeping revision of the law in
37. Id. at 30-31.
38. See id. at 31.
39. Estrada v. Ahrens, 296 F.2d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 1961) (decided before effective
date of section 106). See also Kokoris v. Johnson, 195 F.2d 518, 519 (4th Cir. 1952)
(allowing appeal under the APA). But see In re G__ B___, 6 I. & N. Dec. 159 (BIA
1954) (ruling that departure precludes review of departure order).
40. See Chen v. INS, 418 F.2d 209 (8th Cir. 1969) (appeal of alien who had
voluntarily departed under order of deportation dismissed for want of jurisdiction);
Niarchos v. INS, 393 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1968) (denying petition for collateral review of
deportation order previously executed). But see Espinoza Ojeda v. INS, 419 F.2d 183,
184 n.1 (9th Cir. 1969) (noting with approval lower court's denial of motion to dismiss
an appeal by an alien already deported). That the departure rule of section 106 could
Mendez. These decisions, coupled with the plain language of the
Act, perhaps accounted for the infrequency with which such appeals
were filed; the possibilities for successful review were slight.
Most instructive of the three cases was the Seventh Circuit's opin-
ion in Niarchos v. INS,41 insofar as it involved a forced expulsion
rather than a voluntary departure. Accepting his present de-
portability, the petitioner instead challenged the validity of an earlier
order which had revoked a conditional crewman's landing permit.4"
The INS had failed to provide the alien with an interpreter during
the official inquiry that resulted in the revocation - a failure which
Niarchos claimed a violation of due process in light of his inability to
speak or understand English. 43 The court decried the "shocking cir-
cumstances" of the hearing, noting that the hearing was "contrary to
the aim of our law to provide fundamental fairness in administrative
proceedings";"4 yet the decision upheld the letter of section 106(c)
and denied the petition for review. 45 The Niarchos case demon-
strated the harshness of the departure rule, but conceded that the
courts had no choice but to effect it even in the face of INS
misbehavior.
Mendez and Progeny
The Ninth Circuit ruled otherwise in Mendez v. INS in 1977.
Considering the appeal of an alien whose counsel had not been noti-
fied of his client's imminent deportation, the court held that, in the
context of section 106, "departure" could only be read to include
deportations legally executed.46 Without discussion of the legislative
history of section 106(c), the court concluded that to foreclose re-
view of illegal deportations would be to arrive at a "captious inter-
pretation" of the provision.47 The court accordingly ordered the INS
reverse previous rulings was recognized by at least one witness before the House Judici-
ary Committee during its consideration of the measure. See Hearings on Judicial Review
of Deportation Orders, supra note 11, at 53 (statement of N. Rosenfield). None of the
three pre-Mendez decisions discussed the legislative history of the act.
41. 393 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1968).
42. The order had been issued under 8 U.S.C. § 1282(b). See 393 F.2d at 510.
Although the court found otherwise, revocation of landing permits arguably are not sub-
ject to the constraints of section 106, which apply only to proceedings under 8 U.S.C. §
1252. See 8 U.S.C. § ll05a(a). For present purposes, however, the distinction, and the
possible error, are of little significance.
43. The court highlighted the contrast to his deportation hearing five years later, in
which an interpreter was provided. See Niarchos, 393 F.2d at 510.
44. Id. at 511.
45. See id. The court did express its hope that the Attorney General would take
into account the context of the earlier deportation in any consideration of the alien's
petition for reentry. Id.
46. Mendez, 563 F.2d at 958.
47. Id. at 959 (quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 (1947)).
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to readmit Mendez so that he might pursue appeal in the case. 48
The critical question created by the Mendez ruling was, of course,
what findings would constitute illegality sufficient to defeat the de-
parture rule. The opinion in Mendez seemed to find - without say-
ing so in plain terms - that deportation without notice to counsel
contravened constitutional requirements of procedural due process. 49
But, as the court itself noted, it was not "necessary to invoke consti-
tutional grounds in order to dispose of this appeal";5 0 the decision
relied more clearly upon violations by the INS of immigration stat-
utes and of its own regulations. 51 The court did not speculate
whether its new exception to section 106(c) would apply to proce-
dural irregularities unrelated to the execution of a deportation order,
or where an appeal went to the merits of the order itself. In no way,
however, did it preclude resort to its holding in situations beyond
that considered in the case. If anything, the Mendez decision seemed
to require the assumption of jurisdiction, despite the dictates of sec-
tion 106(c), upon successful allegation of any infraction of the law or
administrative rules occurring during the deportation process.
Most courts have interpreted Mendez expansively, although some
decisions have, in dicta, ostensibly narrowed the exception to apply
only where the alien's challenge rises to a constitutional level.5 2 First
of all, the exception has been held potentially to apply where the
official infraction is slight. Considering a collateral attack on a de-
portation order under which petitioner previously had left the coun-
try, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Calderon-Medina53 paved
48. Id. at 959. After deportation, Mendez had petitioned for reconsideration on the
grounds that the criminal conviction prompting the underlying order had since been va-
cated. Id. at 957. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4).
49. The opinion did conclude that the Mendez deportation had transpired "in dero-
gation of procedural due process," id. at 959, and that the petitioner's "right to...
procedural due process became meaningless when he was deported without notice to his
counsel." Id. at 958 n.l. At no point, however, did the decision specifically assert that
notification of counsel in such cases is constitutionally required.
50. Id. at 959.
51. Notification to counsel was, as the INS itself conceded, required by 8 C.F.R. §
292.5(a) (1987). See Mendez, 563 F.2d at 958 n.l. The court also found the failure to
notify a violation of an alien's right to counsel in deportation proceedings. See id. at 959;
see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b).
52. See Juarez v. INS, 732 F.2d 58, 60 (6th Cir. 1984) (denying judicial review
where petitioner had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies); Newton v. INS, 622
F.2d 1193, 1195 (3rd Cir. 1980) (disallowing Mendez exception where constructive no-
tice to counsel had been effected). In neither case, however, did the holding rest on the
distinction between constitutional violations and those implicating statutory or regulatory
requirements.
53. 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979).
the way for reversal of a deportation order on the grounds that the
INS had not allowed the aliens to contact consular officials prior to
their expulsion.54 The decision denied the government's contention
that section 106(c) stripped the court of jurisdiction, 55 and went fur-
ther to suggest that an alleged violation need not be "concerned with
the integrity of the fact finding process" in order to defuse the de-
parture rule."
Perhaps more significantly, one court has broadened the Mendez
rule to permit reconsideration of the merits of a deportation order
itself, rather than limiting inquiry to the means of the order's execu-
tion.57 In Estrada-Rosales v. INS58 an alien was ordered readmitted
to the United States to pursue a motion to reopen where the criminal
conviction underlying his deportation order subsequently was va-
cated. 9 Furthermore, the courts not only have remedied alleged in-
fractions with readmission and contingent permission to appeal, but
also have heard and ruled on the appeals in full while the alien re-
mained abroad.60 Finally, decisions have ordered the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals (BIA) to respect the Mendez exception despite reg-
ulations imposing the departure rule on administrative proceedings.6 '
Since its establishment in Mendez, the requirement of legal execu-
54. See id. In Calderon-Medina, the INS was alleged to have violated a regula-
tion, 8 C.F.R. section 242.2(e), providing that "[e]very detained alien shall be notified
that he may communicate with the consular or diplomatic officers of the country of his
nationality." Id. at 530.
55. Id. at 530 n.4.
56. Id. at 531 (quoting argument presented by prosecuting counsel). The opinion
did, however, conclude that the violation needed to have "harmed the aliens' interests in
such a way as to affect potentially the outcome of their deportation proceedings." Id. at
532. The case was remanded to the district court for decision of the issue. Id.
57. See Estrada-Rosales v. INS, 645 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1981); see also
Thorsteinsson v. INS, 724 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir.) (denying motion to reopen brought by
deported aliens where claim of ineffective counsel during deportation hearings was found
groundless), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1205 (1984). The dissent in Umanzor, while praising
the Mendez exception as originally formulated, argued that it should be restricted to
situations in which "the alleged illegality intimately touches the departure itself." 782
F.2d 1299, 1306 (5th Cir. 1986). For a discussion of Umanzor, see infra notes 66-70 and
accompanying text.
58. 645 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1981).
59. Id. at 821.
60. See Zepeda-Melandez v. INS, 741 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1984) (asserting juris-
diction on Mendez grounds but denying petition for review of deportation order); see also
Juarez v. INS, 732 F.2d 58 (6th Cir. 1984) (ordering the BIA to consider an appeal filed
from Mexico). Most courts entertaining Mendez attacks on the departure rule, while
ostensibly ruling on jurisdictional grounds alone, have in fact ruled on the merits of peti-
tioners' claims. See Thorsteinsson v. INS, 724 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1984) (examining
claim of ineffective counsel); Newton v. INS, 622 F.2d 1193 (3rd Cir. 1980) (finding no
failure to notify counsel prior to petitioner's deportation). See also infra notes 71-74 and
accompanying text.
61. See Juarez, 732 F.2d 58 (ordering administrative review despite departure of
petitioner); Estrada-Rosales, 645 F.2d at 822.
290
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tion has emerged firmly established in the Ninth Circuit;62 it also
has been accepted by the Sixth Circuit;6 3 and the Third Circuit has
indicated a willingness to follow suit.64 The exception, however, was
subjected to strong criticism in the Fifth Circuit's recent decision in
Umanzor v. Lambert.6"
Defrocking Mendez: Umanzor v. Lambert
The Umanzor court considered a petition for review by an alien
who had been deported less than a week after the BIA affirmed a
denial of political asylum; the deportation occurred before the alien
filed an appeal of the ruling in federal court. The decision found it
unnecessary to confront directly the validity of the Mendez excep-
tion, holding that the deportation had been legally executed. 6 In
dictum, however, the court strongly opposed any dilution of section
106's departure rule:
We entertain serious reservations regarding the "Mendez exception" for, if
the exception is taken to its logical conclusion, any error or procedural de-
fect at any point in the alien's deportation saga (from his arrest, hearing,
BIA hearing, habeas proceeding in district court or appeal to the appropri-
ate circuit court, to his final departure from the United States) would
render the departure illegal. This being so, the later allegation of proce-
dural error by a deported alien would force the district court and the circuit
courts to review the entire matter. .... 67
If applied in this expansive fashion, the opinion concluded, the Men-
dez exception becomes a "sinkhole that has swallowed the rule" of
section 106(c). 68
The Umanzor court's analysis of the Mendez exception enjoys
some merit. Granted, the exception has not, in practice, proved as
fatal to the departure rule as the Fifth Circuit would have it, at least
not yet: to date, only a handful of cases have entertained appeals
from abroad on the basis of deportations not "legally executed."69
62. See, e.g., Thorsteinsson, 724 F.2d at 1367; Estrada-Rosales, 645 F.2d at 820.
63. See Juarez, 732 F.2d 58.
64. See Newton, 622 F.2d at 1195 (noting that "there would be force" to a Men-
dez objection, if one were present).
65. 782 F.2d 1299, 1303 (5th Cir. 1986).
66. See id. at 1303 (concluding that "[w]e need not cross that Rubicon today").
Umanzor apparently claimed that notice to counsel of his deportation had been insuffi-
cient. The court disagreed, noting that Umanzor's attorney had been informed of the
pending execution of the order some 22 hours before the actual departure. Id.
67. Id. (emphasis original).
68. Id. at 1303 n.5.
69. See cases discussed supra, notes 53-61 and accompanying text. See also
Umanzor, 782 F.2d at 1306 (Brown, J., dissenting) (contending that "this Mendez 'sink-
hole' apparently consists of only four cases"); 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRA-
But the exception's potential swath could cut deeply into section
106(c), to the point where no appeal by an absent alien would be
subjected to the summary dismissal Congress evidently intended.
Were this to happen, whatever merit Congress saw in the original
departure rule, and its object of facilitating judicial finality in immi-
gration cases, would be utterly undone.70
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Thorsteinsson v. INS71 well illus-
trates the possible difficulties presaged by the Umanzor critique. The
Thorsteinssons claimed a lack of effective counsel tainted the pro-
ceedings that resulted in their deportation; their attorney had failed
to invoke a defense to deportation which was known to him.7 2 Invok-
ing Mendez, the court considered the facts of the challenge despite
the aliens' subsequent departure under the order. The decision found
no grounds for the alleged infirmity and dismissed the petition for
want of jurisdiction.7 3 In practical terms, however, the court had
gone to the merits; the appeal had been handled just as if the peti-
tioners had never left the country or, alternatively, as if there were
no such provision as section 106(c). Any deported alien could pre-
sumably win appellate review with "mere allegations" of similar pro-
cedural irregularities alleged to have occurred at any point during
the deportation process. The ruling in Estrada-Rosales would seem,
moreover, to permit the hearing of all substantive claims as well.
7 4
"Legally executed" would come to define only those deportations
that might withstand appeals filed by resident aliens. The result: a
judicial gutting of the legislatively mandated rule.
At bottom, however, attacks on the possible breadth of the Men-
dez exception are unnecessary because even in the most limited ap-
plication it violates the letter and intent of section 106. As the
Umanzor court noted in looking to the plain language of the mea-
sure, "[t]he statute's command is unequivocal" in proscribing review
of deportation orders after the affected alien's departure. 75 As this
Article suggests above in examining the legislative history of the
1961 Act in the context of the Heikkila case, Congress apparently
TION LAW & PROCEDURE 8-59 & n.33 (1986) (listing cases involving Mendez).
70. No court considering a Mendez challenge has disavowed jurisdiction where it
has found an infraction of law or regulatory measures to have occurred. But cf. United
States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979) (in collateral attack of prior
deportation order, remanding case for determination of whether regulatory violation af-
fected outcome of deportation proceedings).
71. 724 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1984).
72. Id. at 1367.
73. Id. at 1367-68. The court found that counsel's failure to raise the defense of
equitable estoppel constituted a tactical decision, however unwise, that did not rise to the
plane of ineffective counsel from a due process perspective. Id. at 1368.
74. Estrada-Rosales v. INS, 645 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1981). See supra notes 58-59
and accompanying text.
75. 782 F.2d at 1302.
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intended absolute application of the departure rule - even when an
alien is deported by means not far short of kidnapping.76
Official Exploitation of the Departure Rule
The Mendez decision and its progeny thus have, strictly speaking,
no basis in law; these cases present classic examples of the courts
subverting the legislative will. And yet, in most of the cases where
deported aliens have successfully invoked the exception to win appel-
late review - and in some cases where its applicability has been
denied - the result seems to soundly strike a chord of basic legal
fairness.7 Government-sponsored abduction is presumably one prac-
tice that should not be statutorily encouraged; faithful implementa-
tion of the departure rule could have exactly that effect." Other con-
straints on the immigration authorities do, of course, act to restrain
immigration authorities from standardizing such extreme methods,
and so proper judicial respect for section 106(c) is not likely to lead
the INS regularly to exploit the arguably intolerable limits of the
rule." But there are other situations in which the dictates of fairness
76. See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
77. In United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979), appellants
collaterally attacked a previous deportation in which they had not been permitted to
contact consular authorities. Calderon-Medina seems to be the only case in which the
exception was, from the perspective of fairness, pushed too far. Perhaps not coinciden-
tally, however, Calderon-Medina has emerged as the only post-Mendez decision in which
the court required a showing of prejudice, to be determined on remand. Id. at 532.
Umanzor, on the other hand, perhaps presents an instance in which some general stan-
dard of fairness might have demanded application of the exception. Counsel in that case
was notified of the execution of the deportation order less than two hours before the
alien's scheduled departure, even though delays stretched that period to almost a day.
See 782 F.2d at 1300-01; id. at 1306 (Brown, J., dissenting). The deportation was ef-
fected, morever, well before the expiration of the six month period during which aliens
are given leave to appeal final deportation orders resulting from administrative proceed-
ings. See id. at 1305 (Brown, J., dissenting); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(1).
78. See Umanzor, 782 F.2d at 1305 (Brown, J., dissenting).
79. Persistent and blatant misbehavior on the part of the INS undoubtedly would
result in wide tolerance of the Mendez exception, particularly where it counts the most,
viz., in Congress itself. Some courts have suggested that review jurisdiction in such cases,
which might otherwise be defeated by the alien's departure, could be asserted under the
All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a) (1982). See Reid v. INS, 766 F.2d 113, 117 n.9 (3d
Cir. 1985); Dabone v. Karn, 763 F.2d 593, 597 n.2 (3rd Cir. 1985). INS conduct also
may be subject to some basic constitutional limitations, although the Mendez decision
itself made clear that the exception it established is not primarily grounded in constitu-
tional necessities. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text. Finally, the immigra-
tion authorities appear willing to correct without judicial intervention clear errors in the
execution of deportation orders, even where the departure rule would seem to immunize
the infraction from subsequent review. See Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509 (9th
Cir. 1985) (alien erroneously deported after filing an appeal of deportation order re-
are compromised by the system, albeit in a less glaring manner. The
departure rule, combined with other statutory measures, creates the
possibility that aliens with valid deportation order appeals will never
have their claims heard by the courts or administrative review
boards.
This possibility emerges, for example, where a deportable alien is
not able to procure a stay of deportation during the pendency of a
petition for review. The stay is automatic upon appeal of an initial
administrative determination of deportability or of any other "final
order."80 It is, however, a matter of discretion upon the filing of sub-
sequent petitions, most notably, a motion to reopen deportation pro-
ceedings."' Because a merits hearing of an alien's motion to reopen
may be delayed at the same time as his accompanying request for
stay is denied,"2 the alien might suffer deportation before the motion
to reopen is considered. 3 The departure rule would, in turn, preclude
turned to the United States at government expense). Cf. J. EVANS, IMMIGRATION LAW
333 (2d ed. 1983) (in reference to British law, concluding that "the effectiveness of a
legislative programme, particularly in an area such as immigration where fundamental
liberties are at stake . . ., may be seriously undermined if its administration is widely
perceived to be unfair").
80. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(3).
81. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.22 (1987) (filing of motion to reopen before immigration
judge will not serve to stay the execution of outstanding deportation order); 8 C.F.R. §
3.8(a) (1987).
82. See, e.g., Bothyo v. Moyer, 772 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1985); Kayani v. Sava, 634
F. Supp. 948 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). But cf. Dabone v. Karn, 763 F.2d 593, 597 n.2 (3d Cir.
1985) (holding that an eleven month administrative delay in considering motion to re-
open amounted to effective denial of the motion, subject to judicial review under section
106 as a "final order of deportation").
A motion to reopen and accompanying request for stay of deportation need not be
considered by the same administrative body. A motion to reopen must be made to the
forum in which the deportation order was last heard, i.e., before either an immigration
judge or the BIA. By contrast, a request for stay may be, and often is, heard by a Dis-
trict Director of the INS. See, e.g., Kayani, 634 F. Supp. at 949.
83. Denial of a stay of deportation is reviewable on petition for habeas corpus. See,
e.g., Lopez-Alegria v. Ilchert, 632 F. Supp. 932 (N.D. Cal. 1986). Such consideration,
however, is governed by an abuse of discretion or rational basis standard, under which it
is difficult to win reversal of the administrative ruling. See, e.g., Betrand v. Sava, 684
F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1982); Kayani, 634 F. Supp. 948. But see Anyanwu v. INS, 645 F.
Supp. 266 (D.N.J. 1986) (narrowing the standard where life is at stake); Bazrafshan v.
Pomeroy, 587 F. Supp. 498 (D.N.J. 1984) (same). By contrast, administrative rulings on
motions to reopen, which are considered "final orders" under the ambit of the INA, are
subject upon appeal to the test of substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1 105a(a)(4). This
standard allows a reviewing court to examine the factual support of the administrative
determination, and heightens the possibility for reversal. See Verkuil, A Study of Imni-
gration Procedures, 31 UCLA L. REv. 1141, 1182-84 (1984). One circuit court recently
went so far as to equate consideration of motions to reopen with that of motions for
summary judgment, commanding that the BIA accept the petitioning alien's statements
as true. See Abudu v. INS, 802 F.2d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S.
Ct. 1564 (1987). This disparity between treatment of motions to reopen and petitions for
stay of deportation provides an alternative explanation for administrative delay in decid-
ing motions to reopen where a stay of deportation is denied. Even though consideration of
both petitions may turn on the same facts, the administrative decision is less likely to be
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the opportunity for any future hearing of the petition, however valid
it might be. This scenario is not merely academic; at least one court
has noted that the statutory scheme allows for the suffocation of
such appeals.8 4
The existing statutory scheme cannot avoid the possibilities for
such injustice. Were stays of deportation contingent to motions to
reopen automatically granted, a deportable alien could forestall in-
definitely his expulsion, since new grounds for these petitions may be
produced indefinitely.85 This would hardly be tolerable given Con-
gress' general purpose to expedite the deportation of aliens lacking
meritorious appeals of administrative orders,86 a purpose which also
rationalizes proper enforcement of section 106(c). The problem is
not, however, insoluble: Congress could serve the ends of both fair-
ness to aliens and efficient enforcement of restrictive immigration
measures by abandoning the departure rule altogether. In fact, these
objectives would best be obtained by implementing a new departure
rule opposite to the one that now prevails. With certain exceptions,
review of deportation orders should be permitted only after the peti-
tioning alien has left the United States. Such an overhaul of appel-
late procedure in immigration cases must be set in place by legisla-
tive action; Mendez, Umanzor, and the other decisions helpful in
highlighting the practical quandaries created by section 106(c) sim-
ply should be swept aside.
TOWARD STATUTORY REVISION OF THE DEPARTURE RULE
The departure rule not only allows for unfairness against aliens
who may enjoy tenable defenses against deportation - thus sub-
verting the fairness prong of immigration law - but also creates
strong incentive for aliens without such defenses to delay expulsion,
overturned if it is disguised in form as a ruling on the stay.
84. See Reid v. INS, 766 F.2d 113, 116 n.9 (3d Cir. 1985) (dismissing appeal of
administrative denial of deportation stay for want of jurisdiction). The Reid court con-
cluded that the possibility of preclusion of review in such cases was not a sufficient basis
upon which to assert jurisdiction, "given the relevant statute [section 106], legislative
history, and precedent." Id.
85. See Bothyo v. Mayer, 772 F.2d 353, 356 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985). Alien litigants
have successfully exploited the mechanism of motions to reopen to the point where they
are, in the phrase of one INS official, often only "motions to buy time." 62 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 506, 507 (1985) (memorandum of INS General Counsel Maurice Inman). See
also Sang Seup Shin v. INS, 750 F.2d 122, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Starr, J., dissenting)
(criticizing motions to reopen as creatures of regulatory creation without explicit statu-
tory foundation).
86. See Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 (1970).
thus undermining the efficiency of enforcement. The consequences of
departure after issuance of a deportation order remain severe, even
in light of the expansion of the Mendez exception;8 7 clearly the deci-
sions do not give an advantage to those appealing from abroad. The
alien's possibilities for review are, at best, the same whether or not
he delays expulsion and, at worst, greatly diminished by his depar-
ture. The alien presumably will prefer to extend his stay in the
United States, both because he seeks the benefits of residence and
because some intervening event or circumstance could give rise to
reversal. To this end, all available legal means will be exploited. De-
spite the general intention of section 106 to hasten the expulsion of
aliens without plausible defense to deportation, some are still suc-
cessful in resisting its execution.88 The number of immigration ap-
peals before both the BIA and the courts has, meanwhile, grown
considerably.89 The low rate of reversal indicates that many of these
actions are filed only for purposes of delay."
Given this continuing abuse, it would be desirable to adopt a stat-
utory framework in which aliens are encouraged to leave the country
pending review of deportation. Congressional adoption of the Men-
dez exception would not achieve this objective. Such a move would
only allow aliens one more route of appeal after they have exhausted
those available while resident in the United States, and would in-
crease the burdens on the agencies and courts correspondingly. A
rule requiring immigration appeals to be filed exclusively from
abroad, by contrast, would serve to replace existing mechanisms of
87. A majority of courts have yet to recognize the Mendez exception. See supra
notes 62-76 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Der-Rong Chour v. INS, 578 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 980 (1979). Upholding an administrative denial of a motion to reopen, Der-
Rong Chour considered the case of an alien who had delayed deportation five years
through a series of petitions for habeas corpus, for reconsideration, and for political asy-
lum. The court characterized the appeal as "one more step in an outrageous abuse of
civil process through persistent pursuit of frivolous and completely meritless claims in an
effort to stall a deportation that has been repeatedly ordered by the [BIA] and has been
affirmed by us." Id. at 467-68. Damages of $1,000 were assessed against the petitioner
and his attorney. Id. at 469.
89. The number of appeals received annually by the BIA increased from 4,911 to
8,608 between 1985 and 1986 alone. Interview with Gerald Hurwitz, Counsel to the
Director, Executive Office for Imm. Reviews, Department of Justice, Apr. 11, 1988. Al-
though there has been a drop recently in the number of immigration cases heard by the
courts of appeals in the wake of IRCA, the general trend has been toward a similar
increase in such appeals. Interview with Robert Bombaugh, Director of the Office of
Imm. Litigation, Department of Justice, Apr. 11, 1988. See also Legomsky, Forum
Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process,
71 IoWA L. REV. 1297, 1334-43 (1986).
90. Although the Justice Department apparently keeps no statistics on reversals in
immigration cases, the reversal rate on issues of deportability before the BIA has been
termed "infinitesimal." Interview with Gerald Hurwitz, supra note 89. In the courts of
appeals, the overall reversal rate for immigration cases currently stands at approximately
13%. Interview with Robert Bombaugh, supra note 89.
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review and would undoubtedly result in fewer petitions for review.
The change would eliminate all incentive to file appeals, enjoying no
chance of success on the merits.91
Certain limitations would have to be attached to this revised de-
parture rule to render it legislatively palatable; this new scheme
would create, in undiluted form, far greater hardships than has the
old in practice. Most obviously, humanitarianism if not international
law would demand relief for refugees and those seeking political asy-
lum, who would receive some measure of review before deportation.
Such an allowance would invite, of course, meritless claims of asy-
lum as a new dilatory tactic. But there is already regulatory prece-
dent in place to expedite the dispatch of frivolous motions, and re-
viewing bodies could refine standards for dismissal in order to
discourage unfounded petitions for asylum. Maintaining a high
threshold of proof for this exception would keep the extra burdens
presented by the increased asylum claims to a minimum; in any case,
the extra burdens would be outweighed by overall judicial economies
resulting from the new framework.
Other categories of aliens might also be allowed to appeal adverse
orders, for instance, those aliens with demonstrated ties to family or
business, including most notably those who have established perma-
nent residence. The classifications could be determined during con-
gressional formulation of the package; lessons undoubtedly could be
learned from the British immigration system, with its provisions re-
quiring departure before appeal in some cases. 2 Immigration judges
and the BIA would be delegated the power to give leave for any
appeal at their discretion, thus providing for cases with exceptional
circumstances and cases in which unsettled questions of law give rise
to appeals of clear potential merit. Finally, incentives for official ac-
tion could be created with budgetary weapons by making the INS
91. This observation explains, perhaps, why the Mendez exception has been re-
sorted to so infrequently. Successful invocation of the exception does allow a reviewing
forum to assert jurisdiction over the appeal. It does not, however, necessarily lead to a
reversal on the merits of a deportation order. See Zepeda-Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d
285 (9th Cir. 1984) (while finding jurisdiction to entertain appeal from abroad under
Mendez, the court denied petitioner's motion to withhold deportation for failure to
demonstrate a clear probability of persecution).
92. See J. EVANS, supra note 79, at 343-44, 359-60; Sturtivant, UK-Immigration
Control. An Overview of British Law and Categories of Stay, IMMIGR. J., Oct.-Dec.
1985, at 7. Under United Kingdom Law, aliens who have entered the country without
proper clearance may appeal deportation only from abroad. J. EVANS, supra note 79, at
359. The same holds true for individuals who have been denied requests for upgrade to a
more favorable status, for example, from a student status to a work permit. See Sturti-
vant, supra at 7.
liable for return costs when appeal from abroad results in reversal of
a deportation order.93
The revised framework would not necessarily reduce the
probability of reversal of deportation for aliens with valid appeals,94
nor would it make petitions from abroad unreviewable for failure to
meet constitutional requirements of standing. 95 To the extent that
the framework does not mandate departure in all cases prior to ap-
peal, it might require statutory and judicial refinement in order to
ensure efficient and fair implementation. The possibility of complica-
tions should not, however, deter the initiative, for it is rare indeed
that such comprehensive change can be achieved with perfect legis-
lative strokes. The revised departure rule would, in the long run, an-
swer the difficulties now presented by section 106.
CONCLUSION
Acting to combat the legal maneuvers calculated to defeat the ex-
ecution of deportation orders, Congress amended the INA to limit
judicial review in the area. The addition of section 106 prohibited
the appeal of deportation orders under which an alien had already
departed the United States. The legislative history of the provision,
in highlighting the Heikkila case, demonstrated that Congress in-
tended this departure rule to apply even in more egregious cases of
INS misbehavior. As led by the Ninth Circuit, however, the courts
have diluted section 106 to the extent that it may not preclude the
hearing of petitions filed when a departed alien alleges an infraction
of immigration laws or regulations. Despite strong criticism of it by
the Fifth Circuit's decision in Umanzor v. Lambert, the so-called
Mendez exception has served to highlight the unfairness and injus-
tice inherent in section 106. Only by replacing the present scheme
with one designed to encourage appeals from abroad will this injus-
tice be addressed, while at the same time furthering the objective of
93. There already seems to be an informal INS policy to pay for return fare when
the INS has made an outright mistake in execution of an order. See Hernandez-Ortiz v.
INS, 777 F.2d 509, 512 (9th Cir. 1985) (INS arranged and paid for return trip to the
U.S. from El Salvador). The immigration authorities also apparently picked up the tab
when William Heikkila was allowed to return from Helsinki. See supra notes 27-29 and
accompanying text.
94. Under the British scheme, appeals from abroad enjoy a higher success rate
than those filed from within the country. See J. EVANS, supra note 79, at 341.
95. See Constructores Civiles de Centroamerica v. Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (concluding that nonresidents have standing where the statutory scheme so
intends); Kukatush Mining Corp. v. SEC, 309 F.2d 647, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (same);
Estrada v. Ahrens, 296 F.2d 290, 695 (5th Cir. 1961) (finding nonresidence of petition-
ing aliens immaterial to standing inquiry). Under the Supreme Court's zone of interest
test, a congressionally enacted statute plainly intended to allow appeals by nonresident
aliens would overcome any prudential rationale for otherwise denying them standing for
purposes of reviewing deportation.
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effectively enforcing deportation orders against aliens who enjoy no
tenable defenses to expulsion.

